


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
THE SOVIET MILITARY AID PROGRAM IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

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THE SOVIET MILITARY AID PROGRAM IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The Soviet program of furnishing military aid to underdeveloped countries has continued for ten years despite periodic complications. The program, for example, was unaffected by the change in Soviet leadership last October and was energetically pursued during the past year. The chief recipients of military aid from the outset have been Egypt and Indonesia. More recently, Moscow has expanded aid relationships with India and Algeria based on experience gained in other countries over the past decade. In general, the program continues mainly on the momentum of earlier efforts, but there are indications that the Soviets are willing to revise existing arms agreements and to supply late-model equipment. They have, in recent years, not sought out new recipients. Instead they have merely awaited applications for aid and have undertaken new commitments with considerable caution.

Background

The military aid program is a substantial part of the total Soviet aid effort in the underdeveloped countries. Total Soviet aid extended to these countries since 1954 has amounted to \$7.5 billion. Military aid accounts for over 40 percent of this total, and the value of military deliveries exceeds that of deliveries made under economic aid programs. In the case of MIG-21 jet fighter aircraft, the USSR since 1960 has maintained a special plant for production for export to the underdeveloped countries.

Moscow's 9 May celebration of the 20th anniversary of the

end of World War II provided an opportunity for the Soviet leaders to review their military aid program with many of its beneficiaries. Military delegations, headed by defense ministers or top-ranking military officers, came from Indonesia, Algeria, India, Egypt, Syria, Ghana, and Mali. New arrangements were worked out with Algeria and Indonesia, and India was assured that shipping schedules of equipment on order would be speeded up.


The program has recently suffered two minor rebuffs in Kenya and Tanzania--but progress in India has apparently been encouraging to Moscow. India's stable government, with considerable

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
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SOVIET MILITARY AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES



In millions of dollars

**Value of aid in Nov. 1964 pact unknown*



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international prestige and influence, has responded to cautious Soviet arms offers by requesting a broadening of the program and rapid delivery.

Egypt and the Middle East

Egypt, where the USSR first experimented with military aid through Czech intermediaries in 1955, remains the focus of the program in the Middle East. This major Arab military power is equipped almost exclusively with Soviet materiel, and its military establishment is organized on the Soviet model. The new Soviet regime, following through on Khrushchev's policy, offered Egypt late last year a wide variety of ground, air, and naval equipment some of which had not yet been assigned to other than the Soviet armed forces. The pact was formally outlined in November 1964. The agreement is long range, probably covering very sizable deliveries during the next three years, and the amount of money involved is believed to be large.

Shipments to Egypt under older programs continue. For example, equipment still is arriving under the five-year-old program to supply surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and has been observed thus far at only half the sites established. In

order to get the six-year-old Alexandria naval shipyard into production, the USSR now is supplying prefabricated sections of subchasers for assembly there.

Egyptian interest in exerting influence elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa also has received Soviet attention. The pre-eminent role of Egypt in the United Arab Command (UAC) is supported by Russian agreement to channel arms, on very favorable terms, to other Middle East countries through UAC auspices. Moscow, moreover, has encouraged Egypt's participation in sub-Saharan African affairs.


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Although its chief military aid relations in the Middle East are with Egypt, the USSR maintains direct contact with other states in the area. The USSR last fall made small deliveries to Yemen under a pact signed early in 1964. There have been no new initiatives since then, but Soviet training and maintenance technicians remain in the country.

Military aid relations with Syria, which had been at a low


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MAJOR SOVIET EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES



MIG Jet Fighters

UAR	330	India	12
Syria	136	Morocco	12
Afghanistan	125	Cambodia	5
Indonesia	106	Somali Republic	3
Iraq	77		
Algeria	32		




SA-2 Surface-to-air Missiles (sites)

UAR	16
India	12
Indonesia	8
Cyprus	some
Afghanistan	some

IL-28 Jet Light Bombers

Afghanistan	58
UAR	50
Indonesia	28
Iraq	15
Algeria	12
Syria	6




TU-16 Jet Medium Bombers

Indonesia	26
UAR	20
Iraq	10



**Skoryy-class Destroyers and
Riga-class Destroyer Escorts (not shown)**

Indonesia	16
UAR	4



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W-class Submarines

Indonesia	12
UAR	10



KOMAR Guided-missile Boats

Indonesia	12
UAR	8
Syria	4



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ebb for two years, became more active following a new military pact concluded in October 1964. At that time the Syrian defense minister went to Moscow for a review of Soviet-Syrian relations. Since then at least two Syrian military delegations have visited Moscow to work out details for the agreement and to sign additional contracts. These negotiations covered fighter and bomber aircraft, tanks, naval equipment, and possibly SAMs. The October discussions presumably ironed out problems that had arisen from Syria's brief partnership with Egypt in the United Arab Republic (1958-61). During that time much military equipment contracted for by Syria was in fact delivered to Egypt. Payment problems for these deliveries have been an irritant in otherwise cordial Soviet-Syrian relations.

Soviet military relations with Iraq have remained cool since mid-1963 when the USSR held up arms deliveries as an expression of its displeasure with Baghdad's policy toward the Kurdish rebels. Iraq, [redacted]

[redacted] in mid-1964 negotiated a minor new military aid pact with Moscow. [redacted]

Baghdad limited its new purchases to some 20 MIG-21 jet fighters and to reorders of spare parts and ammunition. [redacted]

Jordan, still equipped with Western equipment, has been approached by the UAC--possibly at Moscow's behest--to consider adopting Soviet equipment for its air force. In an effort to exacerbate Turkish-Greek differences over the Cyprus issue, the USSR met Greek Cypriot requirements for arms despite the complications for Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean. Moscow has attempted publicly to minimize its role in the supply of weapons to Cyprus, which it says are delivered by Egypt, but some \$10-15 million worth of SAM equipment, artillery, patrol boats, tanks, and military vehicles are being transshipped through Egypt on Soviet contracts.

Algeria and Other African Recipients

Before Ben Bella was overthrown last month, Moscow apparently regarded Algeria as a country with a good potential for leadership in the western Mediterranean and North Africa. In October 1963, it concluded a pact for the supply of substantial military aid to

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Algeria. Arms deliveries still are taking place under that pact, and supplementary contracts may also have been signed. The Algerian military delegation to the May festivities in Moscow, led by then defense minister Boumedienne, signed a "technical aid" pact which probably covers additional training and may include more equipment.

The Soviets apparently have attempted to make Algeria militarily dependent on the USSR. Training of Algerian personnel has been at a high level, and equipment has been poured into the country faster than it could be assimilated.



Moscow has treated the Algerian coup cautiously, neither

condemning nor endorsing it. Arrangements have been concluded since it took place for the training of Algerian Air Force personnel in the USSR, suggesting that the military aid program will be continued. Prior to the coup, it was believed likely that the USSR would provide more modern weapons to Algeria--perhaps Komar guided-missile boats and SAMs.

Elsewhere in Africa the USSR has given some military assistance, but because the governments are unstable and inept in managing aid programs, Moscow has avoided taking on major commitments.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the Soviet military aid program has run into Chinese Communist competition. Soviet military aid was first extended in the area in 1960 primarily for political purposes, but because the Soviets did not push their effort and because the area was not prepared to absorb quantities of armaments, the move has not been an unqualified success. Moscow may well re-examine its policy in this part of Africa, however, in the face of Chinese efforts to exploit growing frustration in some of the countries. Mali, with a small amount of Soviet military materiel, already has accepted Chinese arms and military specialists. Ghana, which engaged in numerous talks about expanding Soviet military aid, has welcomed Chinese specialists in guerrilla warfare.

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Moscow seems to be out-distancing its Chinese competitors, however, in Congo (Brazzaville). There, under an arrangement apparently reached around the first of 1965, the USSR has made four shipments of military items to the 1,750-man Brazzaville armed forces. A Soviet training mission also is there, and a small Congolese group has gone to the USSR for aviation training. While China as well as some African countries also supply military assistance to Brazzaville, Moscow's program is best organized.

In East Africa, the Soviet peg point is Somalia, where the military establishment is being equipped by the USSR. Somali ground-force personnel have been given basic training in the USSR, and substantial quantities of ground equipment were delivered following their return home. Soviet teams are in the country to assist native military cadres. Other Somali air and naval personnel have been given training in the USSR. Three MIG-15 aircraft delivered in late 1964 have recently been assembled and flown, and two small patrol craft delivered to Berbera on the Gulf of Aden are being used to establish an embryonic navy.

Elsewhere in East Africa the military program has been modest. Moscow has responded to some official governmental requests but apparently has avoided direct commitment to the numerous dissident groups.

The rebuff Moscow received when Kenya rejected, primarily

for domestic political effect, a shipment of Soviet weapons it had requested a year earlier, was politically embarrassing, but is not of great significance to the over-all Soviet military aid program.

Assistance to Tanzania has been handled gingerly. The Soviet assessment of political conditions there presumably was the basis for the lack of total commitment to that country. The USSR continues to supply a variety of equipment, from small arms and ammunition to armored vehicles and artillery. Soviet training personnel and technicians

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are leaving the country, however, and it appears that no replacements are being offered or requested. Nevertheless the USSR probably will continue to maintain some presence there both as a nuisance to the West and to compete with the Chinese, who appear to have received growing acceptance.

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South Asia

The recent significant expansion of the Soviet military aid program in India probably ranks high as an achievement in Moscow's view. Until mid-1964 New Delhi looked to Moscow only for aircraft. Since that time India's air defense system also has incorporated Soviet SAMs, and agreement has finally been reached on the eventual production of MIG-21 aircraft in Indian plants--the first such arrangement with a nonbloc country.

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The value of the aid program has doubled since mid-1964 and India is adopting a wider range of Soviet equipment. In addition to aircraft, New Delhi is importing tanks and artillery and, in view of British procrastination on the supply of naval craft, may resume negotiations for Soviet submarines and other naval ships.

India's important position in the nonaligned world and its international prestige make it a prime target for the USSR. Nevertheless, in dealing with India, perhaps its most sophisticated customer for arms, Moscow has reiterated its willingness to consider Indian needs but has awaited Indian initiatives.

It is likely that the Soviet military aid program there will gain further momentum. Moscow has been sympathetic to Indian needs and has rapidly made available suitable late-model equipment at Indian request.

Afghanistan continues to depend on the USSR to meet its military needs. MIG-21 aircraft probably will be provided to boost Afghan morale at this year's annual Jeshyn (national day) celebration in August. In 1964 the USSR furnished a few SAMs which have not been seen since last year's parade.

Indonesia

Indonesia, the USSR's biggest weapons customer, continues to receive large amounts of military equipment even though the two countries are not as close as they once were. Equipping the armed forces with Soviet materiel gives Moscow its chief leverage in maintaining influence in Djakarta in the face

of Indonesia's current flirtation with China.

Russia's arms supply role has been complicated by Indonesia's inability to repay and by its hostile actions against Malaysia. Despite Indonesian annoyance, Moscow in 1963 and early 1964 had apparently counseled moderation in the Malaysian situation, making plain its reluctance to support any major aggressive measures against the new federation. Aware, however, that much of Indonesia's "crush Malaysia" program is for political effect only, Moscow has continued shipment of spare parts and deliveries under old arms pacts and accommodated Djakarta by reducing payment obligations.

A special appeal from Indonesian President Sukarno led to the conclusion of a new \$130-million military aid pact in October 1964. The agreement covers additional aircraft and naval ships, but no deliveries are known to have been made yet. An Indonesian mission arrived in Moscow in May [redacted]

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In May the two countries also reached agreement for the USSR to supply central workshops--apparently major facilities--for the repair and maintenance of a wide variety of military equipment. Heretofore, only minor work has been done in Indonesia, and equipment requiring major repairs was returned to the USSR. While Indonesia's goal may be to decrease reliance on the USSR by increasing its own capabilities, no alternate source would offer military support on the scale desired by Indonesia. [redacted]

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